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ABSTRACT 
 
This research paper empirically shows that unemployment is significant in determining 
both consumer bankruptcy filings and delinquency even after controlling for household 
demographics. Furthermore, I show that unemployment and the debt/wealth ratio also 
affect the choice of whether to file for bankruptcy under chapter 7 or chapter 13, after 
controlling for demographics. The paper then points out some of the implications the 
empirical results have for policy-makers and banking regulators.
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Introduction 
 
During the most recent economic downturn, the consumer credit market has 
experienced the highest default/bankruptcy rate in history. Gross and Souleles (2001) 
documented that personal bankruptcy filings in the United Stated rose by 75% in the late 
1990s, occurring in more than 1% of U.S households. The delinquency and charge–off 
rates on credit cards rose almost as sharply (Federal Reserve Board of Cleveland (1998)). 
There have been some leading academic explanations for these trends. One strand argues 
that excessive credit has been extended to sub-prime borrowers and that they have 
accounted for most of the rise in credit defaults. The other strand focuses on the 
decreasing cost of defaulting, including the social, informational and legal costs. Zywicki 
(2002) shows that the operations of the credit card market and consumer choices are 
consistent with rational decision-making subject to real world constraints. Bangia, 
Diebold and Schuermann (2000) look at the default issue from a different perspective and 
propose that macroeconomic activity should be a central determinant of credit portfolio 
quality. Carey (2002) shows that average credit portfolio losses during the early 1990s 
recession is only equal to the 0.5% tail during the expansion. However, these researchers 
were not able to empirically test their propositions. 
The paper extends the current literature in the following ways: First, it tests the 
theoretical model by Wang and White (2000) where a risk-averse, utility-maximizing 
consumer will have maximum probability of filing for bankruptcy when labor income 
drops to zero due to unfavorable macroeconomic conditions. This paper suggests that 
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macroeconomic and employment conditions could significantly affect consumer 
bankruptcy filings even after controlling for household demographics. The bivariate 
probit model shows that if the state unemployment rate increases by 1%, the probability 
of a household filing for bankruptcy will increase by 46%, holding other things constant. 
This is opposed to the literature, which argues that job market conditions driven by 
macroeconomic conditions will diminish after controlling for demographics using 
consumer data. The economic theory also predicts that consumers will default on loans 
when there are unexpected idiosyncratic income shocks, in order to smooth consumption. 
The paper also tests the effect of unemployment on consumer default, which is consistent 
with the consumer life cycle theory. If the state-level unemployment rate increases by 
1%, the probability of losing a job will increase by 54%, thus increasing the probability 
of consumer default by almost 34%.  
In addition, the paper uses a Heckit-type sample selection model to show that 
unemployment could also affect consumer’s choice of whether to file for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, after controlling for the debt/wealth ratio and 
demographics. This shows that consumers could make a rational, informed choice 
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filing, once they have decided to file for bankruptcy. 
This is consistent with the theoretical set up by Wang and White (2000), but opposed to 
Whitford (1989), who argues that debtors are unable to make an informed choice between 
the two chapters.  
Last, the paper points out that the results will be useful for both policy-makers 
and banking regulators. Previous empirical tests have concentrated on Chapter 7 filings. 
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There have been debates in the literature on reform of the bankruptcy codes, especially 
on whether the current codes should be tightened to reduce bankruptcy and whether 
Chapter 13 should be made as favorable as Chapter 7. Moreover, the incidence of 
bankruptcy/defaults could change the general riskiness of consumer loans and 
consequently could change the risk premium and capital allocation as required by the 
banking regulators. The results have shown that consumer risk profiles are sensitive to 
macroeconomics variables such as the aggregate unemployment rate, but consumer credit 
risk modeling has assumed a constant macro economic environment. This time-
homogeneity assumption could be damaging to the efficient operation of financial 
institutions. Gross and Souleles (2001) use panel data on credit card accounts to show 
that credit risk models miss some systematic and time-varying factors. More 
sophisticated measures of credit risk will create a competitive advantage through better 
risk pricing and capital allocation.  
This paper is organized as follows: The first section presents the theoretical model 
of Wang and White (2000) on consumer bankruptcy and the life cycle model by 
Lawrance (1995), which explains consumer default behavior. The second section uses 
PSID data to show that employment conditions are one of the important determinants of 
consumer bankruptcy filings and delinquencies in paying bills, remaining significant 
even after controlling for demographics. A sample selection model is also applied in this 
section to examine the choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 once the consumer has 
already decided to file for bankruptcy. Previous empirical studies have concentrated on 
either combined filings or Chapter 7 filings only. This study shows that households filing 
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for Chapter 7 have a significantly higher debt/wealth ratio and a higher chance of being 
unemployed, which makes the debt consolidation plan as required by Chapter 13 
unfavorable. The third section concludes, pointing out that the empirical results have 
implications for policymakers in reforming bankruptcy law. The previous discussion 
attributes the increase in bankruptcy in part to the passage of the current bankruptcy code 
in 1978, and especially the debt exemptions that it provided in Chapter 7.  
I also point out that consumer risk profiles will shift after loan origination if 
aggregate employment conditions deteriorate. Ignoring this time-varying factor when 
credit risk is modeled could distort proper decision-making and introduce unexpected 
credit loss. This will also affect compliance with Basel II capital regulations, as banks 
will experience abrupt and unexpected loan losses if unfavorable aggregate conditions 
increase consumer defaults or bankruptcy. 
 
Theoretical Models 
The Model on Consumer Bankruptcy Filings 
Skyrocketing consumer bankruptcy filings and commercial bank loan defaults 
have been observed in recent years, and a large academic literature has attempted to 
explain the phenomenon. Most of the papers have concentrated on explaining the nature 
of the credit market or the rational usage of credit by consumers. Zywicki (2002) 
demonstrated that both the operations of the credit card market and consumer choices are 
consistent with rational decision-making subject to real-world constraints. In this paper, I 
use a bivariate probit regression model and PSID household survey data to show that 
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being employed could significantly decrease consumer bankruptcy filings and default 
behavior, even after controlling for household demographic variables. This is an 
empirical test of the model presented by White and Wang (2000). In this paper, I present 
a theoretical model following Wang and White (2000), where the likelihood of consumer 
filing for bankruptcy increases with decreasing labor income and is maximized when the 
labor income drops to zero. 
This is a two-period model where a risk-averse representative consumer 
maximizes utility. In the first period, the consumer works for N1 hours with hourly rate 
w, her total earnings are Y1=w*N1, and her wealth is W1. W1, Y1, N1 and w are known 
for certain. In this period, the consumer also borrows amount B, with an interest rate r. 
She does not know her wealth W2 in the second period at this time; it is uncertain with a 
distribution function f(w2). At the beginning of the second period, W2 is realized; N2 is 
determined endogenously. The loan is also due in the second period, and the consumer 
needs to make a debt repayment decision. If she files for bankruptcy, there is a fixed cost 
of cW2, where c is a constant with 0<c<1. According to bankruptcy law, there is also a 
wealth exemption of E, which is a fixed dollar amount defined by the state where the 
consumer files for bankruptcy.  The consumer must give up all non-exempt wealth above 
this threshold. The representive consumer could keep her wealth if W2<= E. This implies 
that if the consumer files for bankruptcy, her total wealth in the second period will be 
W2(1-c)-max[W2-E, 0]. If she chooses not to file for bankruptcy, her total wealth will be 
W2 – B(1+r). Her lifetime expected utility could be represented as: 
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In this function, e is the post-bankruptcy earnings exemption, which is a 
proportion of period 2 earnings Y2. Under Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedures, all post-
bankruptcy earnings can be exempted from debt paying, so we have e=1. Under Chapter 
13 procedures, debtors are obligated to repay their debt using a portion of their earnings, 
so e<1. The borrowers second period earnings will be eY2 if she chooses to file for 
bankruptcy, while e<=1. Her earnings will be Y2 if she chooses not to file for bankruptcy.  
The first term is the utility in the first period. The second term is her expected 
utility if filing for bankruptcy in the second period, and her wealth is fully exempted from 
repaying. The third term is the expected utility if the consumer’s wealth is greater than 
the exemption and is used for repaying part of the debt after filing for bankruptcy. The 
last term is the expected utility if the consumer chooses not to file for bankruptcy. 
In the utility maximization context, the consumer will choose to file for 
bankruptcy in the second period if: 
~
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There are important implications of this solution function. First, the threshold is 
decreasing when earnings in the second period increase. The probability of filing for 
bankruptcy is the highest if Y2=0. In this theoretical setup, having zero income will 
maximize the probability of filing for bankruptcy. However, due to the limitations of the 
data in the empirical tests, we will be unable to rank order the probability of filings, given 
different levels of income, as we could do in a simulation. A practical solution is to test 
whether unemployment significantly increases bankruptcy filings given a certain set of 
household characteristics. 
 
The Theory on Which Chapter to File for Bankruptcy 
The model in Wang and White (2000) as above does not discuss directly the 
choice between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filings once the consumer has already decided 
to file for bankruptcy. However, this issue has been a critical question given the totally 
different nature of the choices under the current bankruptcy codes. According to the 
current bankruptcy law, Chapter 7 filing can eliminate all or most unsecured debt, which 
includes debts on credit cards, medical bills and most personal loans. The debtor cannot 
keep any significant equity in property, however; she must turn over all of her assets 
above a fixed exemption level to the Bankruptcy Court in return for the discharged debts.  
In this sense, the debtor gets a “fresh start” by filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A 
bankruptcy trustee then sells all the debtor’s non-exempt assets and uses the proceeds to 
repay her debts on a pro rata basis. Under Chapter 13 procedures, the consumer 
consolidates all debts through an interest-free debt repayment plan over the next 3-5 
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years. Under Chapter 13 filings, borrowers must repay unsecured debts at least in an 
amount at least equal to that the creditors would have received under a Chapter 7 filing. 
To file under Chapter 13, the debtor must be working or have a consistent income source 
in order for the court to approve the repayment plan, but she does not have to give up her 
current assets. This suggests that the consumer is much more likely to file for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy if she is unemployed and has relatively low wealth.  
There has been some academic discussion of this issue in the economic literature. 
Domowitz and Sartain (1999) show that higher levels of equity relative to debt push 
borrowers into Chapter 13 filing with a probability double that estimated for low-equity 
households. They also show that other household demographics like higher income and a 
higher employment rate could encourage Chapter 13 filing over the discharge under 
Chapter 7. This is because under Chapter 7 filing, the borrower must give up all 
nonexempt assets in return for being able to keep future income and must maintain 
minimum consumption level; homeownership is not protected.  
Li and Sarte (2004) show that for utility-maximizing consumers, the value 
function of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filer is invariant to the level of wealth above the 
exemption level E, as all assets above this level are surrendered. However, when 
household wealth is high, Chapter 13 filing could dominate Chapter 7 filing. They also 
show that the value function of households filing under Chapter 13 decreases as debt 
holdings increase, as higher debts imply a higher debt burden and reduce the available 
resources for consumption. 
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Evaluating consumers’ choices between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filings have 
important implications for policy-makers. Many proposals for reform focus on 
bankruptcy choices, in particular asking whether Chapter 13 filings should be 
encouraged. The Gekas Bill has proposed forcing all bankrupt consumers with income 
above the median level to repay debt using their post-bankruptcy earnings above a 
predetermined threshold. This potential change in bankruptcy code would affect the 
likelihood that consumers will file for bankruptcy, which in turn could affect credit 
demand and supply and the overall economy. 
 
The Model and Theories of Consumer Defaults 
Over the past twenty-five years, the U.S economy experienced a historical 
increase in personal bankruptcy and a rise in rate of consumer defaults over the past 25 
years. In 1996, bank credit card delinquencies exceeded 3.5 percent – the highest 
delinquency rate since 1973, when statistics were first collected. By 2001, the default rate 
on credit card loans was about 5 percent.  
The academic literature has attributed the record high in consumer defaults to the 
cyclical state of the economy and unexpected job loss. Lawrence (1997) shows that credit 
card defaults and personal bankruptcy filings have exhibited strong countercyclical 
components, moving upward in recessions and downward in economic booms. Hayashi 
(1987) observes that defaultable debt provides a mechanism for insuring future income. 
The borrower will choose to default in the low-income state in return for an actuarially 
higher payment in the high-income state.  
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Lawrence (1995) use a life cycle model to explain why a consumer chooses to 
default in the presence of unexpected income loss. In her model, consumers maximize 
expected life-time utility, and the momentary utility function is of the constant relative 
risk aversion (CRRA) form with the properties that U’ >0 and U’’ <0. To simplify the 
analysis, assume the consumer lives for two periods. Income in the second period is 
uncertain with an exogenous probability q that income will be zero. The borrower could 
increase her first period consumption by x1 through taking a loan, which is due in the 
second period for x2, where X2 = X1(1+R), R being the interest rate.  
In this model, the no-default restriction in the usual life cycle model must be 
relaxed, the reason is that if banks could legally and easily have claims to all the 
resources held by the borrower. In this case no consumers would borrow, as there is 
always a positive probability of earning zero income in the second period, leading to zero 
consumption. 
Within this setup, the consumer maximizes expected lifetime utility, and a zero 
saving – zero borrowing solution is never optimal. Instead, the risk-averse borrower 
chooses to borrow a positive amount in the first period. In the second period, if the 
consumer experiences an unexpected loss of income, he will choose to default on the loan 
in order to sustain a higher consumption level. The intuition is that consumers with high a 
idiosyncratic income have lower marginal utility on additional consumption, so they 
choose to pay back the loan, while consumers with a low idiosyncratic income have to 
default in order to maintain their minimum consumption level. 
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The model’s result is consistent with some previous observations in the U.S. 
consumer loan markets. Borrowers with low income do have a higher rate of 
delinquencies (U.S. National Commission on Consumer Finance (1972)). Sexton (1977) 
used a segmentation approach to show that low-income families with similar social and 
demographic characteristics have significantly higher credit card default rates. Rampini 
(2004) use a one-period model to show that default could allow consumers with 
unexpected idiosyncratic income shocks to repay less, and thus default acts like 
insurance. Default penalties thereafter insure that only those consumers will default. He 
also shows that default rates vary counter-cyclically with macroeconomic aggregations.  
It is important to examine consumer defaults from an empirical perspective for 
two reasons: First, changes in the number of personal bankruptcy filings in the United 
States follow exceedingly closely with changes in the rate of credit card delinquencies. 
Lawrence (1997) pointed out that a change in the rate of delinquency leads a similar 
change in the rate of bankruptcy by about three months. He used aggregate data to show 
that the 1990s have seen an astonishingly tight relationship between credit card 
delinquencies and bankruptcy filings. Second, in the face of the current record levels of 
consumer defaults and bankruptcy, representatives of the retail credit industry have called 
for changes in the bankruptcy law to limit the dischargeability of credit card debts in 
bankruptcy filings. Studying the reasons for consumer defaults could help policymakers 
to evaluate the potential effects of such proposals. 
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Empirical Tests 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), conducted by Michigan University 
since 1968, is a longitudinal survey of randomly sampled American individuals and the 
households in which they reside. The survey concentrates on dynamic aspects of 
household economic and demographic behavior. The 1996 wave of PSID family study 
has questions on household bankruptcy filing, including “Have you ever filed for 
bankruptcy?” and “What was the reason for filing bankruptcy?” By looking at the 
bankruptcy data together with household demographics and state-level unemployment 
rate, we can use bivariate probit regression to see how job market conditions affect 
bankruptcy filing while holding demographics constant. The same wave of the PSID core 
family survey also includes questions on credit delinquency. I use a similar bivariate 
probit model to estimate how unemployment affects consumer default while holding 
household demographics constant. Examining consumer default has further empirical 
implications. First, personal bankruptcy is always preceded by delinquency, so looking at 
the trend of bill payment delinquency should help us to understand bankruptcy better. In 
addition, both bankruptcy and delinquency have been of interest to academics, 
policymakers and banking regulators.           
In this section, I use PSID data to empirically test the propositions in the previous 
section, and I show that unemployment conditions can significantly increase both the 
probability that a consumer will file for bankruptcy and the probability of bill 
delinquency. There have been some disputes in the literature about macroeconomic 
effects on consumer delinquency and bankruptcy filing. Gross and Souleles (2002) argue 
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that the state unemployment rate should be insignificant after controlling for household 
demographics. To investigate these issues, I estimate a bivariate probit model using PSID 
bankruptcy data. In the first equation, both household demographics and state-level 
unemployment rate affect the probability of the household head being unemployed. In the 
second equation, household demographics, together with the binary variable of whether 
the head is unemployed, jointly determine the probability of the household filing for 
bankruptcy (or becoming delinquent). Instead of using state-level unemployment rate in 
the second equation directly, this variable serves as an instrumental. The model is as 
follows: 
Y1i = α + β1X1i + β2 X2i +εI
Y2i = α + β1X1i + β2 Y1i +εI
Where Y1i is the (0, 1) binary variable of whether the i-th consumer was unemployed, X1i 
is a vector of household demographics, X2i is the state-level unemployment rate in 1996, 
and Y2i is a binary variable that indicates whether the household head filed for 
bankruptcy (or whether the household was delinquent in paying bills).  
In the 1996 PSID core family survey, a total of 8327 households were 
interviewed. Eliminating the 20 households who did not respond to the 
bankruptcy/delinquency questions, we have 8307 households left in the sample. Of these, 
526 households (6.33% of the sample) filed for personal bankruptcy. Of the ever-
bankrupt household heads, 32% state that job loss was the most important reason they 
filed for bankruptcy. 
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Using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation of the bivariate 
probit model, we examine how the employment conditions have affected household 
bankruptcy filings; results are shown in table 32. As family income and state bankruptcy 
wealth exemptions could also significantly affect consumer bankruptcy filings per 
previous discussion in the economic literature, the bankruptcy function controls for total 
family income, state exemption level and demographics. As expected, higher family 
income could discourage bankruptcy filing, while higher exemption levels can encourage 
bankruptcy as the households can have more post-bankruptcy wealth. In this table, we 
also see that the age, sex, marital status, number of children and being Caucasian are the 
most important demographic variables in determining the probability of being 
unemployed. I find that the age of the household head is negatively correlated with 
probability of bankruptcy filings. This is consistent with the results of Fay, Hurst and 
White (1998). This is because older household heads have accumulated more wealth 
relative to their debt level and demand less credit. The race variable is also included, as 
previous studies have found that African-American households are more likely to be 
turned down for a loan and have less access to credit. There are also unobservable effects, 
especially those coming from macroeconomic conditions. Using the state-level 
unemployment rate as the instrumental variable can capture this. In the second equation, 
we see that only the age of the household head and his/her employment situation 
significantly affect bankruptcy filing. For the purpose of identification, the state-level 
unemployment rate only enters the first equation, but not the second. The correlation 
coefficient of the disturbance terms is about 78%. 
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We also estimated consumer default using the same PSID sample. Of the 8,307 
households from 1996 core family survey, 2,086 have been delinquent on bills. A similar 
bivariate probit model shows that unemployment is an important determinant of 
delinquency. 
Given the heated discussion on the financial benefits of Chapter 7 filing vs. 
Chapter 13 filing, we are interested in testing what motivates consumers to file for 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy instead of Chapter 7, which could eliminate all unsecured debts. 
The model is based on Heckit-type sample selection. The first step is the bivariate probit 
model described above, which gives an estimated probability of filing for bankruptcy for 
each of the households in the sample. The inverse mills ratio is calculated as one over the 
probability of filing for bankruptcy. The second step is a probit analysis of those 
households who actually filed for bankruptcy. The inverse mills ratio is added in the 
second step as an additional regressor to eliminate sample selection bias.  
Shown in table 37, the results indicates that the only significant household 
demographic variable is the age of the household head. The other determinants that could 
drive Chapter 13 filing are the debt/wealth ratio and employment status. In this paper, as 
data on household total equities in year 1996 are not available, I use the value of the 
house plus total family income as a proxy for wealth. Having a lower debt relative to 
wealth could significantly increase the probability of Chapter 13 filings. This is because 
Chapter 13 requires the debtor to consolidate all debts, which would not be financially 
beneficial if the debt level is very high and the household does not have much equity. The 
household would be better off eliminating all unsecured debt through Chapter 7 filing. 
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However, if the household has relatively low debt and substantial wealth (a valuable 
house), it is better to keep the house by filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and to repay the 
low unsecured debts through the interest-free repayment plan. Further, Chapter 13 also 
requires the household to have consistent income for the next 3-5 years, in order to pay 
back the consolidated debts. This will pose a problem for consumers whose income is 
low and volatile. This type of household would be much better off giving up all assets at 
the time of filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, especially if household wealth is at or below 
the wealth exemption level E.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper examines a theoretical bankruptcy model by Wang and White (2000), 
in which the probability of filing for personal bankruptcy is a decreasing function of 
income, and this probability is maximized when the income level drops to zero due to 
unemployment or any other unexpected job loss. The solution to the model also implies 
that a risk-averse consumers with high unsecured debts, low property and low expected 
income will prefer filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy over Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The 
assumption is that Chapter 7 filing will eliminate most of the unsecured debts, given that 
the consumer relinquishes all her wealth above a certain exemption level. This is to give a 
“fresh start” to the debtor. Under Chapter 13 filing, the consumer can keep his/her 
properties, but s/he must consolidate all debts in an interest-free debt repayment plan, to 
be paid off out of earnings over the next 3-5 years. The model shows that this will 
decrease the marginal utility of purchasing power in the future periods. Given that the 
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consumer can always choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, the model implies that 
the consumer will prefer filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy when her debt is much higher 
relative to the wealth level, or when she is facing a possible post-bankruptcy 
unemployment situation.           
The paper uses bankruptcy and delinquency data from Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics to empirically test these propositions. Using a bivariate probit model, I show 
that unemployment could significantly affect the probability of bankruptcy filing, even 
after controlling for demographics. Using a Heckit-type sample selection model, I also 
focus the analysis on households who have already filed for bankruptcy. For the choice 
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filing, the debt/wealth ratio and unemployment 
dummy variables are the most important determinants of filing for Chapter 7, as predicted 
by the theory. Household demographics do not significantly affect this choice. 
As consumer bankruptcy is usually preceded by delinquency in paying bills, the 
paper also empirically tests the effect of unemployment on delinquency using PSID data 
and the bivariate probit model. The consumer life cycle theory (Lawrance (1995)) 
predicts that consumers choose to default when there is unexpected income shock, in 
order to smooth consumption. The unemployment rate enters the equation significantly 
with a positive sign, showing that probability of default is reduced by about 30% if the 
head of the household has consistent earnings. 
The results have important implications for policy-makers. There has been long 
discussion on bankruptcy code reform. Part of the discussion has centered on whether the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code caused the increase in the number of filings observed in recent 
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years. Previous studies have concentrated on Chapter 7 filings, due to the financial 
benefit of this part of the code. This paper has been able to study both the bankruptcy 
decision and the decision on which chapter to file once the household has decided to 
declare bankruptcy. Controlling for household demographics and assuming consumers 
are rational decision makers, the results show that the number of filings will increase 
significantly if the unemployment rate is higher than usual, as was the case during the 
most recent economic downturn.  
There have also been debates on whether to change Chapter 13 codes, as Whitford 
(1989) argues that debtors are unable to make an informed, self-interested choice 
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. However, the empirical tests in this study show 
consumers do choose in which chapter to file according to their debt/wealth ratio and 
employment conditions. Even though Chapter 13 does not give a “fresh start” as Chapter 
7 does, it does indeed help debtors to retain assets, which is more favorable if the 
consumer has relatively less debt in his/her portfolio and also has a consistent income 
source to accommodate the interest-free debt repayment plan. 
The results may also be useful to banking regulators. Currently, most consumer 
credit risk policies have assumed time-homogeneity and work very well under benign 
economic conditions. As I have shown in the previous section, consumer risk profiles and 
default behavior are significantly impacted by macroeconomic conditions. This personal 
default and bankruptcy issue affects credit markets and becomes more important given 
that current credit risk methodologies are not sensitive enough to provide a cushion to 
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unexpected credit loss during an economic downturn. This is mainly reflected in the risk 
based pricing and credit capital allocation area. 
Currently, credit-scoring techniques based on logistic regressions have been 
widely adopted in credit origination and risk based pricing, but decision-making is 
dependent only on borrower risk profiles at the time of origination. However, the actual 
propensity to become delinquent or bankrupt after origination is affected by changes in 
social and economic factors. Unexpected job loss, a change in interest rate and a change 
in house price can all make default and delinquencies more or less likely. Even though 
these factors affect default probabilities through different channels, they are similar in 
how they are all correlated with business cycles. This challenges the traditional logit 
model, in which the default probabilities are modeled as a function of risk profiles at the 
point of origination. The model is thus static and does not reflect how changing macro 
economic conditions affect risk profiles and default probabilities. 
The empirical results in this paper also have implications for bank regulators as 
they are trying to prepare their standards for new Basel II regulations of capital. In the 
proposed capital accord, lower-rated assets will require more capital in both the 
standardized and, especially, the internal-rating-based (IRB) approach as they have 
higher probability of default. Given the nature of credit scoring models, the assumption 
seems to be that the proportion of lower-rated assets is a direct estimate of the probability 
of default. However, the key challenge is a mechanism to align estimated, rank-ordered 
probabilities from the logistic regression output to the actual probability of default. This 
challenge still comes from the underlying assumption behind the logistic regression 
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approach: the scoring model is not truly “forecasting” in nature as the model usually 
cannot incorporate the changing economic environment over the forecast period, nor can 
it reflect the changing risk profiles of customers. 
Second, even though the increased risk sensitivity brought in by the Basel II 
model has important benefits for capital allocation within and across banks, it also raises 
significant problems when considered across different economic regimes. Capital 
volatility over time is increased materially under the new accord. Ervin and Wilde (2004) 
noted that the impact of the capital ratio under the new regulation is approximately six 
times the impact under the previous guidelines, a major increase in capital volatility. 
They also observed that similar effects occurred in all rating grades and different years 
where adverse credit conditions were present. This could have important effects on the 
overall economy if banks in aggregate are forced to change their lending behavior to 
maintain their capital ratios at times of economic stress. If banks respond by restricting 
new lending, the supply of available credit will be reduced during the adverse part of the 
credit cycle. This could amplify, not reduce, credit cycles and potentially exacerbate 
economic swings. Ervin and Wilde (2004) proposed to flatten the IRB curve, which 
essentially reduces risk sensitivity, the guiding philosophy of the new accord. The choice 
of how to address the volatility of capital in response to credit risk is ultimately is a 
question of how to achieve a balance between these issues and is an important topic for 
further research. 
In summary, developments in consumer credit are influencing, and are being 
influenced by, the efforts to comply with the New Capital Accord. This paper uses 
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household survey data to show that consumer delinquency and bankruptcy filings are 
significantly affected by employment conditions, and the results remain significant even 
after controlling for household demographics. The results are useful to both policymakers 
and credit risk regulators. The results demonstrate that ignoring changing macroeconomic 
factors and the related changes in consumer risk profiles in credit risk modeling can 
affect proper risk pricing of consumer loans and mis-specify the capital allocations 
required by Basel II regulations.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 Count Percentage 
Ever BK 526 6.33% 
Never BK 7781 93.67% 
Total 8307 100% 
Table 0. Ever Bankruptcy Distribution in 1996 PSID Core Family Survey 
 
 
 Count Percentage 
Ever delinquent 2086 25.11% 
Never delinquent 6221 74.89% 
Total 8307 100% 
Table 1. Ever Default Distribution in 1996 PSID Core Family Survey 
 
 
 Mean 
Age of household head 44 
If household head is male 0.69 
If household head is married 0.52 
If household head is college-educated 0.21 
If household head is Caucasian 0.56 
Number of kids 0.91 
If household head is unemployed 0.33 
Table 2. Mean Values of Independent Variables in the Regression 
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 Estimate Standard Error 
State unemployment rate 0.1260 0.0086 
If head is college-educated -0.3909 0.0403 
Age of head 0.0221 0.0009 
If head is male -0.3245 0.0407 
If head is married -0.4526 0.0417 
If head is white -0.2893 0.0318 
Number of kids -0.0610 0.0131 
Table 3. Bivariate Probit Regression: Unemployment Equation 
 
 
 Estimate Standard Error 
If head was unemployed 1.4207 0.1156 
Family income ($00,000) -0.1550 0.0467 
State property exemption ($0,000) 0.1802 0.0284 
If head is college-educated -0.4677 0.0532 
Age of head -0.1541 0.0023 
If head is male -0.3354 0.0537 
If head is married -0.0693 0.0606 
If head is white -0.1838 0.0389 
Number of kids 0.0401 0.0152 
Disturbance Correlation: Rho(1, 2)=0.7238 
Table 4. Bivariate Probit Model: Bankruptcy Filing Equation  
 
 
 Estimate Standard Error 
If head was unemployed 0.7127 0.1151 
Family income ($0,000) -0.1928 0.0031 
If head is college-educated -0.0046 0.0411 
Age of head -0.2595 0.0014 
If head is male -0.1373 0.0403 
If head is married -0.1616 0.0434 
If head is white -0.1021 0.0309 
Number of kids 0.0986 0.0136 
Disturbance Correlation: Rho(1, 2)=0.1683 
Table 5. Bivariate Probit Model: Bill Delinquency Equation 
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 Count Percentage 
Chapter 7 264 50.29% 
Chapter 13 261 49.71% 
Total 525 100% 
Table 6. Chapter of Bankruptcy Filing 
 
 
 Estimate Standard Error 
Age of household head 0.0088 0.0050 
Debt/wealth ratio -0.0010 0.0003 
If head was unemployed -0.4204 0.1721 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.6802 0.3097 
* wealth is approximated by house value plus family income. 
Table 7. Probit Analysis of Filing for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy  
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APPENDIX B 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a longitudinal survey data 
conducted by the University of Michigan since 1968. Over its life, it has been funded by 
several government agencies, foundations and organizations. Their current major funding 
sources are the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Aging.  
The PSID data is a panel study of representative U.S. individuals (men, women 
and children) and the household they reside in. Its emphasis is the dynamic aspects of 
economic and demographic behavior. But the actual coverage is much broader than these. 
In the recent years, special topics include extensive questionnaire on wealth and credit 
background, which has been very useful for the purpose of this dissertation.  
The survey project has been very successful in re-interviewing families previously 
in the study and following new families as young adults “split off” from their parents. 
The sample households included in the study is about 7000 now.  Previous research has 
shown that PSID is a good source of information on the distribution of basic economic 
variables such as income, wealth, homeownership and employment in the larger 
population. One of the important features of PSID data is its comparability of data quality 
and structure over time. The general design and content of certain important income and 
demographic variables have remained unchanged, which makes it easy to construct a 
clean and consistent time series of income dynamics for each individual or household. 
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This paper is a study on the preference of general household investment, it is 
important to have a data set representative of American households. PSID is the only 
longitudinal representation of families and individuals of all ages. National Longitudinal 
Survey (NLS) and Health and Retirement Study (HRS) also provide data of panel 
features. However, the samples are tilted toward either young cohort or older cohort, who 
have represented different investment behavior as pointed out in the literature.  
As one of the most important measures in this paper is labor income risk over the 
15 year period, PSID provides the best estimation. Income measures in PSID include 
taxable income, transfer income, social security, asset income, and business income. And 
the measures are mostly available for head, “wife” and other family members. Each 
wave’s report also has the 3-digit Census code on the head’s and wife’s occupation and 
industry. 
Gouskova and Schoeni (2002) compared the annual income observations from 
PSID with March Current Population Survey, which is a cross-sectional national survey, 
and is the basis for the government’s official estimates of income and poverty. They 
compared income estimates for the PSID history 1968-1999. The results show that the 
distributions match closely in the range between the 5th and 95th percentile through the 
entire 30-year history of PSID. And the differences slowly disappeared during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. As this dissertation uses data PSID data from 1980s to early 1990s, we 
should thus be able to infer that the income risk measures in this paper are representative 
of U.S. household. 
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The active savings file and the wealth supplements provide rich sources on flow 
of money in and out of different assets. Curtin, Juster and Morgan (1988) examined the 
quality of PSID wealth data and found it representative of total wealth and the 
distribution of wealth in the great bulk of the U.S. population. They also found the overall 
potential of examining wealth using PSID data is comparable to using Survey of 
Consumer Finance data on a cross-sectional basis. However, we did not use SCF data due 
to the fact that it does not provide the unique panel feature essential for measuring 
income risk.  The general descriptive statistics from PSID are also closer to the actual 
population than that provided by SIPP. The PSID data also has a much lower non-
response rate than SIPP, and is much less necessary to impute certain values, which 
reduces potential estimation error.  
The 1996 wave of core family data in PSID also provides questions on bill 
payment delinquency and bankruptcy filings, which enabled the study of the third essay 
in this dissertation. This feature will be otherwise unavailable in the other panel data sets. 
For the sample used in the first and second essays in this dissertation, I use data 
from 1979-1996. I drop the Latino over-sample in 1990-1992. I then use 1979 as my base 
year, treating all families in this year as main families, and subsequent split off families 
are dropped from the sample. A family is also dropped if it did not respond in any year. 
Finally, I drop the two cases in which total asset income of other family members is top-
coded. This leaves a balanced panel of 4884 households.  
Table 2 shows the sample selection criteria for the first two essays. Table 3 shows 
the variables used in the regressions and their mean values. The mean family labor 
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income in 1994 from my sample is about $42,000. And the mean family total income 
from PSID 1994 total sample is about $47,000. We can see that the level of labor income 
after my sample selection remains comparable and representative as in the original PSID 
sample.  
Table 6 shows that the percentage of stock ownership ranges from 20% to 30% in 
the sample periods, which is also comparable to the literature during the same time span.  
Overall, the important input variables for this dissertation include family 
demographics, labor income dynamics, the self-reported house value, the amount of stock 
ownership and the value of checking and savings account. Careful examination of each of 
the component shows that they are comparable to other major household survey data on a 
cross-sectional basis, representative of the general households and could provide panel 
features as well, which won’t be available other wise. In no ways, this data set could be 
perfect. However, we are trying to use the best information possible and the available 
resources from PSID are rich enough for us to examine income risk profiles and 
household stock participation preferences on a panel basis.  
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